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I.  INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Directive is to explain the exemption from Massachusetts sales tax for
purchases of motor vehicles for the use in transporting persons described in G.L. c. 64H, § 6(u). 
Because certain persons described in G.L. c. 64H, § 6(u) may be minors or adults who cannot
legally enter into binding contracts, this Directive discusses the availability of the exemption in cases
where a person other than the person described in section 6(u) purchases a motor vehicle for the
personal, noncommercial transportation of an otherwise eligible person.  It also provides the rules for
substantiating a claim of exemption by the purchaser of the vehicles.
II.  DIRECTIVES
Issue 1:  Does the sales tax exemption in G.L. c. 64H, § 6(u) apply to purchases of a motor vehicle
for use in transporting a minor child described in G.L. c. 64H, § 6(u)?
Directive 1: Yes. The purchase of a motor vehicle by a parent or legal guardian of a minor child
described in G.L. c. 64H, § 6(u) is exempt from sales tax.  In order to substantiate a claim for
exemption, the following conditions must be met:
1. The name(s) of the parent(s) or legal guardian(s) of the qualifying minor must be on Form RMV-1
as the owner; and
2. Form RMV-1 must be accompanied by a properly completed DOR Form MVU–33[1] in the name
of the qualifying minor child.
Issue 2:  Does the sales tax exemption in G.L. c. 64H, § 6(u) apply to purchases of motor vehicles
for use in transporting an adult described in G.L. c. 64H, § 6(u)?
Directive 2:  Yes. The purchase of a motor vehicle by a legal guardian or legal conservator of an
adult who is both 1) unable to enter into a legal contract and 2) who is a person described in G.L. c.
64H, § 6(u) is exempt from sales tax.  In order to substantiate a claim of exemption, the following
conditions must be met:
1. The name(s) of the legal guardian(s) or conservator(s) of the qualifying adult must appear on the
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Form RMV-1 as the owner’s; and
2. name of the qualifying adult.
III.  DISCUSSION
Massachusettsimposes a sales tax on retail sales in Massachusetts of tangible personal property,
including motor vehicles, by any vendor, unless exempt under a particular provision of law.  G.L. c.
64H, § 2.  The exemptions from the sales tax are found in G.L. c. 64H, § 6.  In general, G.L. c. 64H,
§ 6(u) excludes from sales tax the amount charged for:
[A] motor vehicle purchased by and for the use of a person who has suffered loss, or permanent
loss of use of, both legs or both arms or one leg and one arm.  This exemption shall apply to
one motor vehicle only owned and registered for the personal, noncommercial use of such
person.
The first sentence of G.L. c. 64H, § 6(u) exempts sales of a motor vehicle that is purchased by and
for the use of a person qualifying for exemption under the statute.  The second sentence of the
statute, however, contains no express requirement that the purchaser actually be a person described
in G.L. c.64H, § 6(u).  It grants the exemption merely to any vehicle owned and registered for the
personal non-commercial use of such person.[2]  We examine whether, in light of the statute as a
whole, a person described in G.L. c. 64H, § 6(u) must also be the actual purchaser of the vehicle.
In examining statutes, the words must be construed in association with the general statutory plan. 
See Commissioner of Revenue v. Wells Yachts South, Inc., 406 Mass. 661, 664, 549 N.E. 2d 1131
(1990), citing Baker v. Binder, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 287, 289, 609 N.E. 2d 1240 (1993).  Every statute,
if possible, is to be construed in accordance with sound judgment and common sense, so as to
make it an effectual piece of legislation.”  Brunette v. Board of Assessors of Southampton, A.T.B.
Docket No. F231437 (1996 Mass.) citing Sun Oil Co. v. Direction of the Division on the Necessities
of Life, 340 Mass. 235, 238 (1960), quoting Commonwealth v. Slome, 321 Mass. 713, 716 (1947). 
It is also a canon of statutory interpretation not to overemphasize one word or part of a statute at the
expense of another word or part, in order to produce a rational result in consonance with the
presumed intent of the legislature.  See Deblois v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 276
Mass. 437, 438 (1931).
To carry out the general purpose and intent of a statute, courts are often compelled to construe “or”
as meaning “and,” and “and” as meaning “or”.  See, e.g., 70 U.S. 445, 447, 18 L. Ed. 243, 3 Wall .
445; Williams v. State, 99 Ark. 149, 137 S.W. 2d 927 (1911); New Jersey State Bd. Of Optometrists
v. Koenigsberg, 33 N.J. Super. 387, 11 A.2d 325, 328-9 (1954).  In Massachusetts, “there is ample
precedent for construing the word “and” disjunctively in order to further a recognized legislative
purpose.”  See, e.g., Massachusetts Association of Cosmetology Schools, Inc. v. Board of
Registration in Cosmetology, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 706; 667 N.E. 2d 282 (1996), citing Somerset v.
Dighton Water Dist. 347 Mass. 738, 742-743, 200 N.E. 2d 237 (1964).  See also Brunette v. Board
of Assessors of Southampton, A.T.B. Docket No.F 231437 (1996 Mass. Tax LEXIS 55), citing
Assessors of Holyoke v. State Tax Commission, 355 Mass. 223, 243-244 (1969).
The Commissioner is unaware of any decisions discussing the legislative intent behind G.L. c. 64H,
§ 6(u).  However, the Massachusetts Appellate Tax Board has examined a similar provision found in
G.L. c. 60A § 1.   See Brunette v. Board of Assessors of Southampton, A.T.B. Docket No. F 231437
(1996)  construing G.L. c. 60A, § 1.  That provision states:
The excise imposed by this section shall not apply. . . to a motor vehicle owned and registered
to any person who has suffered permanent impairment of vision of both eyes. . . .  This
exemption shall apply to not more than one motor vehicle owned and registered for the
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personal, noncommercial use of such veteran or person.
In the Brunette case, Mr. Brunette and his wife were both registered owners.  The Commissioner
argued that since only one registered owner was disabled, they were entitled to only 50% of the
exemption.  Noting that Mr. Brunette would never drive the car, the A.T.B. stated that “[i]t is not
unreasonable to assume, and perhaps it would be unreasonable not to assume, that the spouse of a
blind person or other physically challenged person would be the joint registered owner of a vehicle
that could never be driven by the disabled spouse.”  Id. Acknowledging that “[a] statute should not be
read in a manner which defeats its utility” and observing that requiring joint ownership and
registration would, per se, deny to the physically challenged person the full exemption, the A.T.B.
granted the parties a full abatement.  The Board further stated: “Clearly it was the intent of the
Legislature to provide a small advantage, in the form tax relief, to those persons who are blind or
physically challenged in some other way.  That admirable goal should not be vitiated by an
interpretation of the statute which defeats its utility and thwarts its very legislative purpose.”  Id., citing
Commonwealth v. Wellesley Toyota Co.,18 Mass. App. Ct. 733, 736 (1984), quoting Simon v.
Solomon 385 Mass. 91, 100 (1982).
In examining G.L. c. 60A, § 1, the A.T.B. examined the various sentences as a whole.  The Board
stated:  “To the extent there is any issue as to whether the Legislature, by the first quoted sentence
of the statute, intended to require exclusive ownership and use of the vehicle by the impaired
individual, it is obviated by the last quoted sentence.  Id.  “By use of the language, ‘this exemption
shall apply to not more than one motor vehicle owned and registered for the personal,
noncommercial use of such veteran or person,’ (emphasis added) the Legislature evinced an
intention to allow the full exemption for one motor vehicle as long as the vehicle is owned and
registered for the noncommercial use of a person who is blind.”  Id. Clearly, the A.T.B. construed the
phrase “such veteran or person” in Chapter 60A as referring to a blind owner/registrant, regardless of
whether the vehicle is jointly owned and registered by a non-blind owner/registrant.
The Commissioner applies the same reasoning here.  The second sentence of G.L. c. 64H, § 6(u),
which is similar to the second sentence of G.L. c. 60A, § 1, also indicates a legislative intention to
allow the exemption to a purchaser of a motor vehicle, who is not described in section 6(u), so long
as the vehicle is owned and registered for the use of the otherwise qualifying person described in
that provision.  In Brunette, it was unreasonable not to assume that someone other than a blind
person would drive the vehicle; it would be equally unreasonable here to assume that a disabled
minor child or adult who cannot enter into a legally binding contract is the actual purchaser of the
vehicle.  For this reason, the phrase “such person” must refer to the § 6(u) eligible person, regardless
of whether that person is the actual purchaser of the vehicle.
In accordance with the general principles of Brunette, the Commissioner interprets G.L. c. 64H, §
6(u) to include purchases by someone other than the person described in G.L. c. 64H, § 6(u).  So
long as the vehicle is owned and registered for the personal noncommercial use of an otherwise
eligible person, the exemption is not unavailable solely because the eligible person is not the contract
purchaser of the vehicle.  However, while the exemption in G.L. c. 64H, § 6(u) applies to motor
vehicles purchased with the original intent to transport a person eligible under that provision, it does
not apply to a motor vehicle originally purchased without the intent that it be used by or for a person
who would otherwise qualify for exemption under § 6(u).  Upon installation of a lift in the vehicle, the
purchase of the lift would be exempt under a separate statutory provision, G.L. c. 64H, § 6(l),
provided that the lift has been prescribed by a registered physician.  See DOR Directive  00-7.  It
also does not apply to repair or replacement parts, such as oil or tires.  Contrast other sales tax
exemptions, such as G.L. c. 64H, § 6(aa), pertaining to motor buses used to provide scheduled,
intracity service, which explicitly includes “repair or replacement parts therefor, and material and
tools used in for the maintenance and repair thereof . . . .” or G.L. c. 64H, § 6(pp) pertaining to
vessels used exclusively to provide scheduled commuter passenger service and “repair or
replacement parts therefor, and materials and tools used in and for the maintenance and repair
thereof.”
IV.  CONCLUSION
the language of G.L. c. 64H, § 6(u), taken as a whole, coupled with a recognition of established
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principles of statutory construction, allows an exemption for purchases of a motor vehicleby a person
other than a person described in G.L. c. 64H, § 6(u), so long as the vehicle is owned and registered
for the personal, noncommercial use of the § 6(u) eligible minor child or adult.  In order to present a
claim of exemption, the substantiation requirements of this Directive must be met.
/s/Alan LeBovidge
Alan LeBovidge
Commissioner of Revenue
AL:LEM:wrd
October 20, 2003
DD 03-11
[1]Affidavit in Support of a Claim for Exemption for Sales or Use Tax for a Motor Vehicle Transferred
to a Disabled Person.
[2]The Motor Vehicles regulation, 830 CMR 64H.25.1 also contains provisions involving sales or
transfers of a motor vehicle to and for the use of any person who has suffered a loss described in
G.L. c. 64H, § 6(4).  See 830 CMR 64H.25.1(7)(f).
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